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JOSEPH VINING

Generalization
in Interpretive Theory
T II v R v

u MEN TS at large about the nature of legal interpretation, proceeding from an implicit proposition that interpretation is the sarnc
phc110111cnon or experience whatever its setting. An ass11rnptio11 that there is one
phc11onw11on can Ix found in discussions among lawyers of interpretation and
in discussions among nonlawyers of legal interprctation~and as often in the
11ork of those who would deny there is any significance to theorizing about interpretation, as of those who think persuasion to a particular theory will lwve the
utmost consequence for law and society.
Proceeding from such a proposition, rather than toward it, raises the risk that
distincti\{' features of legal interpretation mav be overlooked. If there is to be a
common understanding or theory of interpretation it should not be built upon
rnisinterpn'lation of the evidence. As examples from law appear more frcquentlv
in nonlegal settings, and 11011lcgal examples in discussion of law, distincti\{' lcat111es of legal interpretation are the more easily overlooked. These features an·
linked, hut they may he roughlv divided and treated under lour headings. Some
arc 111on· obvious than others. Some will he more obvious to lawyers than to nonlawycrs, but it is an odd characteristic of current discussion tha1 the re\LTse rnay
also he t n1c. 1
A RE A RC

Identification of the Text

The first of these features of leg·al interpretation has to do with what
is often called identifying a text. Some, such as Steven Knapp and Walter Benn
1\lichacls, argue that ide111ilicatio11 of marks or sounds as a text involl'cs belief that
thn are a product of the intentions of an agent (using "agent" in its special philosophic sense rather than its common or legal sense)." Others would identify
marks as a text through their relationship to other marks in a sonwwhat freefloating svstem. 1 But, for both, there seems to he assumed something lying before
the reader, some determinate set of marks, some work, much as there is an object
lwfo1-c one when one comes up to a piece of sculpture or listens to a piece of
music that has a beginning and an end. That is not the situation in law.
Not that one never comes in law to a sentence, a page, an opinion one has to
read ;111d make sense of; of course one docs, but that is at the very end of one's

Rt•:PHESENTATIONS

30 • Spring· J(J90

(<j TIii-: IU:(;ENTS ()[- TIH. l1NlVl•.l{SJ I

y

OF CALIFORNIA

interpretive work, and perhaps that is not even then the end. For in the repeated
runs at analysis of a situation made possible by a hierarchical institution of argument, one piece of writing with the meaning of which one has been wrestling,
one section of a statute or constitution, the law of one jurisdiction or another, may
be pulled away and replaced by another sentence, another section, another book.
When a practitioner asks, "What is the law here? How is this case to be analyzed?" no hand thrusts out a text and says, "Here, this is what we are now going
to read and construe." Interpretation in law is, from the beginning, of the law.
The law is not to be equated with any particular set of marks or sounds nor even
with the meaning of any particular set of marks or sounds. And a small methodological consequence of this may be noted, that it would not be true to the
experience of interpretation in law to suppose that if one could achieve an
account of the identification of and reading of one or another example of a legal
text, one would then have in hand the problem of legal interpretation.~
Cases do not come ready made, as teachers repeatedly emphasize to students
being gradually introduced to law. The initial question in practice is of the form
"How ought this situation to be thought about under the law?"-after, of course,
the situation is delimited as a situation-or "What ought to be done here under
the law?" In the course of analyzing a situation, one text, then another, may be
invoked and become the focus of attention. Starting as an "Occupational Health
and Safety Act case," a death in a factory may end as a case of corporate homicide
under the general criminal law. It may become a constitutional case as well as a
case of ordinary law. A car repossession case involving allocation of money and
risk, seen immediately as a case of common law contract or a "Uniform Commercial Code case" between "buyer" and "seller" or "debtor" and "creditor," may in
addition become a "Federal Trade Commission Act case" between "dealer" and
"customer," involving federal administrative regulation of economic power. Or it
may become a case of civil wrong, a tort case, rather than a contract case, or a
securities law case rather than a case of either contract or tort_,-, The applicability
of particular texts, the focusing upon particular judicial opinions, evolves as analysis proceeds.
Recalling this very basic aspect of the practice and experience of legal interpretation is not to introduce what is sometimes thought most distinctive about the
world of law, the clever litigator working against that which is self-evident. There
is no self-evident nature of a case to be worked against. If a case comes to litigation
(as it does, indeed can, in only a very tiny percentage of the situations in which a
legal question is put), it may be given well-formed contours by the time it gets to
an appellate court. Still, appellate judges, even appellate judges, must struggle
with its nature or characterization. Once an appellate opinion is written, of course
it appears the case always was what it came to be. The interpretive question seems
to be how given texts are applied to particular facts-even though those particular facts are remarked upon, and corralled off from the whole, in response to
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the proposed applicability of texts. And perhaps, once the appellate opinion is
written, the interpretive question not only seems to be that, but is. But then that
appellate opinion becomes merely one more of the many expressions of the law
that legal practitioners, starting again with another situation, may or may not be
led to as they go about considering what the meaning of the law is for the situation
they have before them.
This evolutionary quality of the text to be interpreted, that is encountered in
practice, is not simply a matter of canon formation-particular texts or parts of
texts gradually becoming central in legal analysis, the focus of discussion, through
hierarchical devices or otherwise. And it does not simply reflect the flight of any
text, once composed, into mere candidacy for attention (though this is implicated:
if authority consists in being paid attention-which is also a form of praise-every
text is only a candidate for attention, and its capacity to evoke and maintain attention can never be assumed). Largely unexplored, this is in law an analogue, pale
perhaps, of the formation of melody in music. It is difficult to explore, however
comfortable with it thousands of practitioners appear to be in their daily work.
On it, on what a case is "about" and how it takes shape, any very direct comment
confronts the special problems language imbued with the static poses for discussion of the dynamic_G But an eye can be kept on it, and an eye at least on the actual
dynamism oflegal thinking must help avoid a misleadingly photographic \'iew of
law as one in which a human being or human beings in general stare at a line
carved over a doorway, or at a book in the hand, or, to take an example sometimes
discussed in literary theory, tracings in the sand on a beach. 7 Particular texts
simply do not step forward when one asks, "What is the law here, how am I to
interpret the law?" And even the universe of possibly relevant texts always has a
quivering edge.
This fact indeed, or, if not fact, this truth of legal experience, is always in the
background of "easy cases." A case easy in the hands of one may not be easy in
the hands of another, and the text that records the disposition of a case as an easy
case becomes just one more datum to be considered critically by a later analyst
looking at a new situation. Situations are not, in contemplation of law, each
unique in the sense Tolstoy took to be his own Yiew of situations in history/ but
situations in contemplation of law are living, and that alone brings them, and the
law, out from under the pictt,{re of matching up a rule to a set of factsY

Types of Writings
Mention of constitution, statute, contract, opinion points to the second
problem in the thrust toward generality in discussions of interpretation. The
fruitful pulling of experience in law toward experience in other fields has in it
the danger that those reflecting upon interpretation may be tempted to induce
Generalization in I ntcrpretivc Theory
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their sense of interpretation from the instances of it they see, including instances
in law, without sufficiently taking into account that much of the writing being
treated in law may be different in kind and that writings in law may differ in kind
from one another. What is perceived to be going on in work with a contract, for
example, is not ground for any very definite assertion about what is done in
working with a statute, and neither the handling of contracts nor of statutes is
more than a provocative source of speculation about the way a constitution or a
set of opinions is read. Even among lawyers methodological conclusions are
sometimes drawn after-and as a result of-carelessly lumping various kinds of
legal texts together.
In literature the language of texts is rarely negotiated and bargained over.
Particular texts rarely begin their life fashioned by more than one hand. There
is Beaumont and Fletcher, there is the phenomenon of editing, there is the folk
ballad built up through successive contributions of anonymous singers, and there
is the writer who writes or revises a piece over a lifetime. But among the texts
literary critics discuss there is not often one in the genesis of which an individual
agrees to worcls he does not want or mean to say, through some exchange relationship with another or as a result of delegating the writing of it, or the words
of which are the immediate outcome of a process of assembly in which many have
been independently at work. Nor is there often one with words attributed to a
human being who may never have seen them, as to a voter or to a principal
"bound" by the words of an agent. In law such texts are encountered quite often,
and this should give pause to literary critics working with law, and indeed to philosophers reaching out to law who are similarly schooled in and accustomed to
text-focused discussion in their various fields of professional inquiry.
The differences to be found upon examination of legal texts, type by type
and text by text, are pertinent to the large uncertainties of current discussion.
In particular, lawyers' work with contracts, statutes, the writings of agents, and
the writings of delegees does not as such point to the objectivity of language or
the irrelevance of a statement's origin. To take only contracts and statutes: in the
construction of many contracts the true intent of the parties is explicitly excluded
as a subject of inquiry. This may illustrate only that in many cases legal analysis is
not interpretation of meaning. Legal analysis of writing can proceed rather in
what might be called a "tort mode." "Tort," the law of civil wrong, has as its concern action and visiting the consequences of action upon the actor, and a party
may be made to pay money (or money is shifted from one stream of wealth to
another) because she should have known the consequence of inserting or allowing
someone acting for her to insert a mark or a set of marks into a machine called a
contract, regardless of what she might have wanted those marks to express. 10 The
history of contracts is prominent in the teaching of contracts, in great degree
because the emergence of contract from tort and the difficulty even now of distinguishing between tort analysis (of acts intended or unintended, and their con4
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sequences) and contract analysis (if the latter suggests inquiry into the concrete
meanings of words) can be thus demonstrated and emphasized.
As for statutes, often and perhaps typically the origin of a statute's words in
committee processes and bargained or strategic voting forecloses inquiry into the
meaning of those who have touched it. Nonetheless, statutes in general seem to
be read, and not simply as vector products of the forces that made them in the
legislative machinery.'' But this fact, this evidence of what lawyers do, is again not
ground for conclusions (by lawyers or nonlawyers) about the way other kinds of
texts-opinions or administrative regulations or, a fortiori, nonlegal texts-are
or should be read. The reading of statutes for "their intent," the paying of close
attention to nuance and form in them, may be a necessary and even desirable
form of self-delusion. Self-discipline is still discipline; a society under the rule of
law may allow itself some arbitrary freedoms, play a trick or so on itself. But the
scope of such reading and the amount of such attention are limited by the necessity and the desirability of self-delusion. 12 It is not to be concluded that because,
in law, texts that are the product of machinery seem to be interpreted, therefore
interpretive theory should pay attention generally to marks on paper and sounds
that are the product of processes untouched by mind. The often noticed tendency
in legal practice to pull back to and focus upon judicial opinions may be not
merely a result of the conventions of legal education, evidence not merely of
judge-centeredness or concentration upon litigation by sociologically uninformed lawyers, but a reflection of a belief that opinions are more likely to be
texts that can be read and can be the subject of interpretation.

Distinctions Between
Reading and Writing
The third observation to be made about generalization in current discussions of interpretation is that it may be overlooked how much lawyersreaders of legal texts-are also and (almost) at the same time writers of legal texts.
In order and association this point could as well follow discussion of the firstthe difficulty of establishing what the text is that one is to interpret-as the
second, the differences in the kinds of writings that are attended to in law. ,:i
While there are sensitive general accounts of the phenomenon of reading
that show the reading of a major literary work and the reading of law as a responsible reconstitutive act, 14 the widespread image of law as given to the subjectwhether in Babylonian bas-relief, Weberian sociology, or modern positivism 1" has in it the potential to mislead, and may exert the greater influence as law ceases
its intellectual isolation and excites the curiosity of those who are not lawyers.
When one picks up a novel or poem the possibility of a difference between
reading the novel or poem and writing it is an obvious starting point (not quite
Generalit.ation in Interpretive Theory
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so obvious of course in music or drama, where performance is necessary to the
play or the song).rn But in law a difference between reading and writing is not an
obvious starting point at all, not just because one cannot pick up and hold in one's
hand a large and shifting mass of legal texts with indefinable edges, but because
as a lawyer one reads for the purpose of oneself making a statement of law for
which one is responsible. Lawyers in the schools make their statements to students
or the world at large; in administration or in what is commonly designated as the
practice of law lawyers make their statements to client or commission or, acting
as judges or attorneys general, to the world at large. 17 The lawyer reads in order
to write, must read from the beginning in an active frame of mind and must make
a statement of-and for-the law. That statement, in turn, becomes part of what
is read for a time by others who themselves must make statements of law. Insofar
as lawyers listen to any general account of interpretation that ignores their constant writing of the law, they are led astray; and insofar as those outside the
profession seek to illumine their own experience of interpretation with an understanding of legal interpretation as passive or static, they are led astray.

Identification of the Author

How much do all these points-the difficulty of identifying the text,
the variety of texts, the joinder of writing with reading-fold into and derive
from that most signal feature of legal discourse, that writers of legal texts do not
speak for themselves? Perhaps this is a fourth point; perhaps it is not (but it is not
the same as the appearance in law of delegated writing). Certainly it should not
be overlooked when looking to law.
To put it concisely though paradoxically, if writers of legal texts (again, not
including contracts, which may not be speech) were to speak for themselves, they
would speak without authority. They speak for the law or for an entity-the court,
the agency, the legislature-that in turn speaks for the law, with the possible exception of the legislature, and even then there is an ostensible speaking for, for the
"sovereign" if not "the law." The late-twentieth-century sensibility may want to
ignore these others, these authors beyond, as passe figments, but if one does
ignore them one does so at the price of depriving speech of authority.
It is further true that a speaker's speaking for an entity-or for the law-is
never a given, but is a question always alive, to be determined by the listener.
Though a situation may be disposed of for the moment, as if the speaker spoke
the law, the question whether the speaker was authorized so to dispose of that
situation may be examined whenever the disposition is examined; there is no
foreclosing of the question: it is posed and answered in a nonf-inal way again and
again as time goes on.
From this general observation legislators again may possibly have to be
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excepted (other than with respect to the narrow range of utterances that may be
disregarded on constitutional grounds). But if the legislator is an exception, that
very fact is part of the reason listeners are pressed back to the utterances of
judges-that blank interposition, that wall between the listener and the author
whom the listener is seeking to hear, which a legislative claim always to speak for
the sovereign presents. Of course the legislature could claim to be not agent but
itself sovereign, but that is not the assertion that is made. It is, possibly, an assertion that never has been made where authority has been claimed and law invoked.

Convergences
Emphasizing these features of the experience of legal interpretation
does not proceed from or inevitably toward some form of nominalism. Consider
again that central term in current discussion, intent. Precisely because they are
writers lawyers might be expected to be especially sensitive to the complexities
of intent. That they are writers is what might hold them back from embracing
propositions about authorial intent made in arguments either for or against
its existence or importance to interpretation-this rather than philistinism or foreignness in the work they do.
Legal writing is often not expressive. Very often it is manipulative only. But
when it is expressive and there is true effort to make a statement of law, participation in it is almost as fine as participation in any kind of writing. The writer of
a poem does not say what the poem means by reference to his conscious intent in
the writing of it, because he cannot; and in adding one more voice to those who
have made this point I may invite for company the not insubstantial number who,
though they may not consider themselves poets, have been moved now and again
to write a poem. If the poet could so explain himself, he might then have written
differently. Much about a poem can in a real sense be explained to the writer of
it without (as we say) putting words into his mouth. Listening to another expound
his poem, the poet, if he is to respond at all, reflects not on the memory of his
conscious thought but on why he stopped his daily business to write (daily business including taking a walk or staring at his desk) and, if the poem did not appear
in full bloom, on how and why he labored over it as he did. The experience of
reaching-one always reaches in a poem-includes the experience of trying to
get lines and words right. And, it must be said, the writer of legal prose does the
same.
He writes, and looks. The thrust of this seems inconsistent with that, the
emphasis within this passage is misleading, this or that word is not just (the very
metaphor just is a legal one). The writer tries to get the word, passage, or statement more satisfactory, or, in some rare cases, satisfactory. Ifhe does not abandon
it for reasons of time or fatigue, it may eventually lock into place, not be improvGeneralization in Interpretive Theory

7

able without hurting it in some (other) way. But, as he works, molding and
rewriting, he cannot say what he is doing. If he could the labor would lw <>\Tr. It
will be allowed, and by those who dwell upon the writing of a paragraph of prose
as well as those who venture to write poetry, that in the placing of words, ;111d in
all that touches upon the aesthetic of echo and multiple reit'ITIHT, much ~dfconsciousness or consciousness of what one is doing leads a\\'a\' from the li,·i11g
and resonant and toward the rote and the dead. But the same is true in the first
drawing of a word from the mind, when, as the saving is, a \\'ord comes to mind. 1K
Intentions are veiled, they are being expressed in the \\'Ork, and writer as \\'ell as
reader looks to the work as evidence. (The lawyer especial!\' is in the position of
having readers: other writers may be able to conceive of writing wit bout readers
talking to them about it, but not lawyers, who are therefore constant I\' confronted
with the question of their own intent.)
And what the reader does, the close reader, is seek ultimatelv to identif\' ,,it h
the writer who is thus reaching and trying. If such resonance and such identification turn out to be possible, the writing is good, a carrier of meaning. Hermes
is without clothes, save for his traveling hat, because he assumes such a multitude
of forms.

Advantages of Particularity
There are thus generalities to be achieved. It needs merely to be noted
that what is critical in the achieving of them is to see from the inside those experiences that are to be merged. But particularity has its larger uses too. An attentive understanding of law might be helpful in saving practitioners in other fields
from misdirection. Take as an example the field currently being most vigorously
developed-with what is widely thought to be the most significant potential for
large practical changes in ways of life-the design and programming of sophisticated computers.
Work on equipping computers to process human language draws on linguistics, which in one of its prominent current forms distinguishes what are proposed
as rules for the construction of sentences, "syntax," from "semantics," which has
to do with the meaning of the constructed sentences. One hears it said that syntax
determines what constitutes a legal sentence of human language, and there is
hope for machine programs that will reject illegal sentences-all without regard
to meaning. 19
The terms legal and illegal in this setting should be a little warning, a cause
for caution. Legal and illegal are powerful and attractive terms, used to make the
governing distinction between syntax and semantics more vividly plausible, but
also quite possibly drawn upon for the substance of the distinction itself. There
is something of the same in Virginia Woolf's reference to "law" in her comment
8

REPRESENTATIONS

in Three Guineas, "The Church being a spiritual profession has to give spiritual
and not merely historical reasons for its actions; it has to consult the mind, not
the law." 20 If it should come to be understood that consulting the law is consulting
the mind, and that what is legal or illegal is not determinable without an inquiry
into meaning, the work of machine designers and programmers and speculation
upon the possibilities of future human organization based upon their contributions would not be confuted; but legal practice and thought would no longer be
a source or prop of work in these fields. Its powerful attractions and validations
would be withdrawn. If machine designers are then left with a notion of rules,
divorced from meaning and mind, that can be connected only to natural science
and the laws and rules thereof, and if this should prove unsatisfactory given the
source and character of a scientific law, they may just possibly be freed to proceed
in new directions, and will at least be somewhat better protected from elaboration
that in the end proves disappointing and discouraging, if not indeed dangerous
as it is absorbed into the forms and methods of human organization. 21

Prospects

So too explorers from the literary and linguistic disciplines who sail
into law may discover something of help to them in their own thinking, if they
stay for a time-if they do not return too quickly with the news that great numbers of apparently intelligent people are reading for meaning marks on paper
that no one means, or marks that are the product of forces not associated in any
way with mind. If they come to law, as some literary critics do, bringing with them
belief that there is an ineradicable connection between the spoken and a speaker,
they may help lessen somewhat the pressure lawyers have felt so long from
pushing against the long depersonalizing thrust of the modern age. Their presence may even make it more difficult for lawyers to mislead themselves, as they
do, when talk turns to the Rule of Law and (trying to express what it is to live in
a world in which no one including the legal analyst is above or outside the law)
they encl somewhat like the tragic Antigone, projecting an image of law as a set
of rules outside, a grid that, could you only tap it with your fingernail, would give
out a hard metallic ring. Lawyers may need nonlawyers to help them turn to what
they actually do when under the Rule of Law they work responsibly with common
and public texts.
Regardless of what those who are now discovering law leave behind, on their
return to their own disciplines they may find it more difficult to collapse meaning
and the speaking voice either into the intent of an author bound to time and place
or into one or another form of system or process, a language system, the reasons
of history. They may find that they are encouraged, themselves, to maintain a
connection between words and intention, to keep words a gateway to intention
Generalization in Interpretive Theory
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even for the fashioner of them. The small space within the skull of the individual
is not the only retreat from the empty reaches of system and process, if it is a
retreat at all. Nothing rules out another alternative a priori; lawyers cannot forsake the personal and the concrete for the impersonal objectivity of system, but
they do not stop with mere particularity. After a sojourn listening to lawyers and
attendiug to what lawyers actually do, some at least may be less uncomfortable
than before with an occasional thought of a person speaking who is not an individual, an occasional thought even of a transcendental intention, less uncomfortable too with the possibility of conceiving their own activity as having, like law,
something of a moral thrust toward the future and the whole and toward actionof conceiving writing and speaking, perhaps in general, as a discovery of what
one did not know was in one, with others taking it up to place it against the whole
and using it to make their own statements, which are then again subject to criticism against the whole by anyone who is also in responsible contact with what
there is to be expressed.

Notes

I.

~:i.

4.
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Rudolf Arnheim, Alton L. Becker, John H. D'Arms, Kenneth .J. Dewoskin, Bruce
Mannheim, Jennifer Nedelsky, Robert Post, Philip Soper, James Boyd White, and
Christina B. Whitman have made helpful comments on the manuscripl.
The contributions and footnote references in "Interpretation Symposium," Southern
C11lt/omw raw Rn,iew 58 ( I 98:i ): I-7'.Ui, provide a contemporary survey of discussion
of legal interpretation other than in work in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. A series of papers by SteYen Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels offers an elegant
entr<'-c to discussion among literary critics of interpretation gcncrallv. See "Against
Theorv." Critical Inquiry 8 ( I 982): n:)-42; "A Reply to Om Critics," Critical lnq11i1y 9
( 1983): 790-800; "A Reply to Richard Rorty: What Is Pragmatism?" Critical lnqui1)' I 1
( 1985): 466-73; "Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction," Critical
Inquiry I 4 (1987): 49-68. Knapp's and Michaels's contributions between 1982 and
1985 are collected in convenient form together with related papers by others in W.J. T.
Mitchell, ed., Against Theory: Litera1y Studies and the New Pragmatism (Chicago, I 985).
With respect to artificial intelligence and its possible application to computer reading
or writing of statements of law, sec Anne von der Lieth (;ardncr, An Artificial Intellignue Aj,jnoach to Legal Reasomng (Cambridge, Mass., I 987); I lnbcn Simon, The Scienff1 of flu: Artificial, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., I 982), l '.l0-59.
Knapp and Michaels, New Pmgrnalism, 16, 140-41.
A text is to be thought only 1ornew/wt free floating because much contemporary reflection on the possible objectivity of language, outside law, is reluctant to grant that the
meaning of a word or a sentence in a language is an empirical matter. E.g., Stanley
Cave II, Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge, I 976), 1-43.
This is quite aside from differences in kinds of legal texts, to be noted below, but not
to say that examples of texts-such as the inheritance statute in Riggs v. Palmer (see
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Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously [Cambridge, Mass., 1978]), or the opinion in
Rylands v. Fletcher (liability without fault in tort; see A. W. Brian Simpson, "Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher," Journal of
Legal Studies l 3 [ l 984]: 209-64)-are not examined closely, or that it is not profitable
to do so.
5. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 673 F. 2nd 1008 (9th Cir., l 98 I), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982); People of Illinois v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., no. 8311091,
Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. ( 1985).
6. My own comments may be found in Joseph Vining, Legal Identity (New Haven, 1978),
93, 94, l I 9-20, 134; The Authoritative and the Authoritarian (Chicago, 1986; revised ed.,
1988), 21-22, 74, 176, 217-18, 221.
7. E.g., Knapp and Michaels, in Mitchell, New Pragmatism, 19.
8. I think of the epilogue to Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Rosemary Edmunds, 2
mis. (Baltimore, Md., 1976), 2:1339-1444.
9. Nonlawyers are sometimes astonished to find this true even in matters involving business: when one is engaged in one's affairs and sells an orange grove, and, under the
law of contract, engages to harvest and sell the oranges for the buyer of the tract, the
securities laws may become relevant. Though what one has in one's hands are a property deed and a contract, and though no gilt-edged paper changes hands, the situation
one has brought about may eventually be analyzed in "totality," "in truth," "substance,"
"reality''-the words are used-as the "selling of a security." See Securities and Exchange
Commission v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Glrn Arden Commoditie.1, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1386 (E.D. N.Y., 1974), aff'd sub nom. Glen
Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F. 2nd 1027 (2nd Cir., 1974).
10. Knapp and Michaels are aware of this. See "Against Theory 2," 63. The involvement
of an agent ("agent" in its legal rather than philosophic sense) extends and complicates
such analysis.
11. The "tort mode" is not really applicable to legislation. Unlike contracting parties' acts,
the consequences of legislators' acts are not visited upon legislators themselves but
upon others and upon the future of the world; nor can the consequences accorded
legislators' acts be reduced to reversible shifts in money flows.
12. Further discussion of this aspect of the legislative text may be found in Vining, Authoritati11l' and Authoritarian, chaps. 9, 10, and 11.
13. Perhaps not all should be called texts. Some, as noted, may not be speech or treated
as speech.
14. See James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions
of Language, Character, and Community (Chicago, 1984).
15. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber (Stanford, Calif., 1983), 11, 22, 28, 45, 53,
73, 89-91; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford, 1983).
16. E.g., Knapp and Michaels, in Mitchell, New Pragmatism, I 03. Art invites, but does want
to daunt. Restating into life what is heard-reviving and building-it nonetheless
wants a circle woven round it thrice: to deny to its readers, through closure, the possibility of doing what it has just demonstrated the possibility of doing.
I 7. The word rlient may not convey the spread of the audiences to whom a lawyer speaks
in ordinarv practice. The client is often an institution, or an agency of government.
Others beyond the client may be expected to rely upon an opinion letter. In fact, in
some circumstances an opinion letter may be mandated by statute.
Special considerations, and rule formulations of them, apply to lawyers' statements to a judge in litigation.
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18. Owen Barfiekl's Poetir Diction: A Study in Meaning, 2nd ed. with afterword (Middletown,
Conn., 1972), is in part a meditation, indeed a lawyer's meditation, on the place of
conscious thought in writing and speaking.
The first word that comes to mind is of course not necessarily the last. The critical
faculties are there to meet it. But the critical faculties can be engaged only if there is
something for them to be engaged upon.
19. E.g., Michael A. Arbib, fo Search of the Person: Philosophirnl Explomtio11s i11 Cogllitive Sci(')l[(' (Amherst, Mass., 1985), 32; '"English as a Computer Language," The 1-:101w111ist, 4
April 1987, 84-85.
20. Virginia Woolf, Three Gui11ms (New York, 1963), 125.
21. Since writing the above, 1 find Roy Harris making a similar point in stronger fashion
in The La11guage Machine (Ithaca, N.Y., 1987), particularlv at 136-:n, using inter alia
A. M. Turing's reference to "authority" in his "Computing l\lachinery and Intelligence" ( 1950) in Alan Ross Anderson, ed., 1Hi11ds a11d Mr1rhi11e.1 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J .,
1964), 8.
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